The Classical Theory of Supply and Demand by Inoua, Sabiou M. & Smith, Vernon L.
Chapman University 
Chapman University Digital Commons 
ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute 
3-2020 
The Classical Theory of Supply and Demand 
Sabiou M. Inoua 
Vernon L. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers 
 Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics 
Commons 
The Classical Theory of Supply and Demand 
Comments 
ESI Working Paper 20-11 
   
The Classical Theory of Supply and Demand 
Sabiou M. Inoua1 and Vernon L. Smith2 
Chapman University    
 
Abstract: This paper introduces and formalizes the classical view on supply 
and demand, which, we argue, has an integrity independent and distinct 
from the neoclassical theory. Demand and supply, before the marginal rev-
olution, are defined not by an unobservable criterion such as a utility func-
tion, but by an observable monetary variable, the reservation price: the 
buyer’s (maximum) willingness to pay (WTP) value (a potential price) and 
the seller’s (minimum) willingness to accept (WTA) value (a potential price) 
at the marketplace. Market demand and supply are the cumulative distri-
bution of the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices, respectively. This WTP-
WTA classical view of supply and demand formed the means whereby mar-
ket participants were motivated in experimental economics although ex-
perimentalists (trained in neoclassical economics) were not cognizant of 
their link to the past. On this foundation was erected a vast literature on 
the rules of trading for a host of institutions, modern and ancient. This pa-
per documents textually this reappraisal of classical economics and then 
formalizes it mathematically. A follow-up paper will articulate a theory of 
market price formation rooted in this classical view on supply and demand 
and in experimental findings on market behavior. 
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1 Introduction                                                      
This paper introduces and formalizes the classical view on supply and de-
mand, which, we argue, has an integrity independent and distinct from the 
neoclassical theory. The new school, as is well-known, replaced the old in 
the 1870s through a widespread acceptance of constrained utility maximi-
zation as a core principle of economics.1 Yet a century later, utility maximi-
zation is proven to have no interesting implication for aggregate (market) 
demand behavior, not even the law of demand except under artificial, re-
strictive conditions. While this major aggregation problem of standard price 
theory (the ‘anything goes’ or SMD theorem2) is often simply if unintention-
ally evaded in most applied models through the representative-consumer 
simplification (Hildenbrand, 1983; Grandmont, 1987), or by falling back on 
some additive utility structure or other forms of cardinality (Arrow, 1986; 
A. Kirman, 1989; A. P. Kirman, 1992), a few mathematical economists ex-
plored a pathway out of it, which consists of investigating the law of market 
demand as a collective regularity holding by integration over the distribu-
tion of consumers’ preferences or incomes, thus turning aggregation into 
the solution, rather than the problem, of the law of market demand: for 
example, income or wealth effects, which are the main issue in the arbitrar-
iness of neoclassical market demand, can be shown to be well-behaved by 
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aggregation over a diverse population of consumers (essentially by the law 
of large numbers).3 Ironically, this is the way the law of demand was under-
stood in classical economics; Marshall, for example, who—as further em-
phasized below (Section 2.1)—tried to revive the classical view on supply 
and demand, makes it clear that his clause of constant marginal-utility of 
wealth (oft-discussed but oft-misunderstood in modern commentaries) is 
inconsequential on the aggregate of many consumers, poor and rich com-
bined (Marshall, [1890] 1920, pp. 15-16, 83). More important for our objec-
tive here, the old school articulated a price discovery process which found 
unexpected new meaning in experimental markets establishing their re-
markable decentralized convergence properties; these properties were not 
and could not be predicted by neoclassical modelling (Chamberlin, 1948; V. 
L. Smith, 1962). The goal of this paper is to rehabilitate mathematically the 
classical view on supply and demand. The classical view is easy to under-
stand by opposition to the neoclassical one that replaced it, but which in-
troduced into economics a series of mischievous innovations. For example, 
it used to be taken for granted in economics that economic reality is discon-
tinuous at the micro level: not only is economic decision (both demand and 
supply behavior) binary (to buy or not to buy, to sell or not to sell is the 
problem), but goods come in discrete units and their relations are binary; 
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for example, a consumer choses between two substitutes, rather than sub-
stituting infinitesimal amounts of goods, which strictly speaking are empty 
concepts. (For example: is an infinitesimal amount of a diamond still a dia-
mond? Or even water?) While many of the marginalists were well aware of 
this point through Cournot ([1838] 1897, p. 50), they nonetheless assume 
that economic variables are smooth so as to use the tools of differential 
calculus.   
Moreover, individual demand and supply, before the marginal revolution, 
are defined not by an unobservable criterion such as a utility function, but 
by an observable monetary variable, the reservation price: the buyer’s 
(maximum) willingness to pay (WTP) value (a potential price) and the 
seller’s (minimum) willingness to accept (WTA) value (a potential price) at 
the marketplace. The underlying concept in value theory, in other words, 
used to be, not pleasure or satisfaction in consuming a good (which is ex-
perienced, or not, after the fact of purchase), but the consumer’s valuation 
of a good, the maximum the consumer would be willing to pay for the good 
given his expectation of the good’s usefulness. Market demand and supply 
are simply the cumulative distribution of the buyers’ and sellers’ reserva-
tion prices, respectively. This WTP-WTA classical view of supply and de-
mand formed the means whereby market participants were motivated in 
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experimental economics although experimentalists (trained in neoclassical 
economics) were not cognizant of their link to the past. On this foundation 
was erected a vast literature on the rules of trading for a host of institutions, 
modern and ancient. (Holt, in Kagel &Roth, 1995, pp. 360-377.)                                                                                                                                                                                
Classical economics is not commonly viewed in these terms; rather it is of-
ten reduced to a simplistic supply-side, cost or labor theory of value, that 
fails to explain even the basic water-diamond value paradox because it was 
thought to be lacking the concept of marginal utility (a misunderstanding 
and distraction; Inoua & Smith, 2020a). Therefore, we must briefly revisit 
the old literature to document our interpretation and to frame the analysis 
in Section 2, which derives the classical conception of supply and demand 
progressively and heuristically from the classical literature. The second part 
of this paper (Section 3-4) is a formal restatement of classical supply and 
demand. Section 3 formulates mathematically the supply side of classical 
economics and derives key propositions of classical value theory.4 Section 4 
derives the less known demand side, with special attention to the founda-
tion of classical demand theory, as it is made explicit in the French classical 




    
  
2 The classical methodology  
Overall, the classical economists adopted a methodology that can be sum-
marized in three principles:   
Principle 1: It is a realistic portrayal of a market economy based on astute 
observation of individual behaviors and interaction in the marketplace. 
Principle 2: It derives from the acute observations and facts about the econ-
omy’s deep emergent properties that are the collective unintended conse-
quences of these latter, the results of human actions but not of human de-
sign.5     
Principle 3: Supply and demand are classically given by an observable, oper-
ational, monetary value: the reservation price—the buyer’s maximum will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and the seller’s minimum willingness to accept (WTA).   
This paper, which is part of a general rehabilitation of classical economics, 
deals more specifically with Principle 3, the classical conception of supply 
and demand.6 It is thus situated within the authors’ overall rehabilitation 
project: it emphasizes how supply and demand were viewed before the 
marginal revolution. Alfred Marshall attempted to reconcile this old view of 
supply and demand with the new-born marginalist school.  
2.1 Marshall’s revival of a key principle                                                                                                                                                                                             
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Alfred Marshall’s ‘pairs of scissors’ image is often invoked in an oversimpli-
fication of the history of modern economics divided into three phases: from 
the classical, supply-centered, cost or labor theory of value to the early      
neoclassical demand-centered, marginal-utility theory of value, and to Mar-
shall’s synthesis of these two one-sided views into a unified price theory, 
which, allegedly, became the foundation of contemporary economics. Yet 
Marshall actually holds a more subtle view of the history of economics: his 
‘pairs of scissors’ metaphor was merely intended to put an end to an old, 
essentially metaphysical, controversy over the ultimate cause of value—a 
problem which consisted of deciding which one of the two, unanimously 
recognized,7 basic causes of value, utility or cost, is the most primitive 
cause. Marshall’s reading of the history of economics, at the time, is unique, 
in that he most clearly recognized what was really at stake during the mar-
ginal revolution. Though he accepted diminishing marginal utility (DMU) as 
central to value theory (making him a marginalist of course), yet he saw in 
Jevons’s program a major setback from a core methodological principle of 
classical economics, which is often overlooked in modern commentaries. 
This principle consists of dealing, as regards individual economic decisions, 
not with the ultimate psychological forces driving them, but operationally 
with the monetary sacrifices that people make in order to satisfy them. 
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Thus, the relevant concepts for demand theory, for example, are, not the 
ultimate psychological motivations behind demand decisions (desire, want, 
pleasure), which had defied any precise quantitative modeling, but the 
money prices consumers are willing to pay in order to acquire the desired 
goods. This most fundamental principle, is applied equally to the supply 
side, and to market price theory more generally. Investigated from the 
standpoint of people’s feelings, the value attached to an object reflects ul-
timately the desire of possessing it and the effort in producing it (an object, 
in this sense, is valuable, the more it is desired, and the more difficult it is 
to produce, in terms of toil and trouble)8. But investigated from the stand-
point of the monetary values (or prices) traders in a market are willing to 
pay in order to produce or consume a good, the market price simply bal-
ances the ordered set of higher values that buyers are willing to pay to pos-
sess the good, with the ordered set of lower values that sellers are willing 
to accept in order to produce it. This, as textually documented below (Sec-
tion 2.2), was precisely how supply and demand were understood long be-
fore the marginal revolution.                                                                                                                              
Alfred Marshall, perceptively recognizing this classical methodology, cred-
ited its discovery to Adam Smith, whom he viewed as having launched an 
epoch in the history of economics when he built from this principle a value 
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theory that unifies all of economics “by a clearer insight into the balancing 
and weighing, by means of money, of the desire for the possession of a 
thing on the one hand, and on the other of all the various efforts and self-
denials which directly and indirectly contribute towards making it. Im-
portant as had been the steps that others had taken in this direction, the 
advance made by him was so great that he really opened out this new point 
of view, and by so doing made an epoch.” ([1890] 1920, Appendix B, p. 759). 
It is in fact this principle for measuring motives that confers upon econom-
ics a special quantitative nature among the social sciences ([1890] 1920, 
Book I, Ch. II, p. 12). Thus, in reaction to the hedonistic marginal utilitarian-
ism of Jevons and Walras, who make pleasure the fundamental motivating 
category of economics, Marshall reformulates it operationally—as did the 
classicists (and, as it was applied, unknowingly, in the first market experi-
ments)—entirely in terms of WTP and WTA (or demand-price and supply-
price, as Marshall calls them, because he wanted to relate that difference 
to the incentive for seller entry)9. This WTP-WTA approach to supply and 
demand frames value theory throughout the classical literature; we first 
emphasize the demand side, since it is the less known.    
2.2 Classical demand and French contributions                                   
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The demand side of classical price theory is sketched in Adam Smith’s Lec-
tures on Jurisprudence ([1763] 1869), under ‘Cheapness and Plenty’, which 
prefigures the Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1904). In the magnum opus, he 
simply grants that the purpose and foundation of consumer demand is to 
satisfy need, and he expresses demand in terms of WTP. He then directly 
explains price formation from the competition (higgling and bargaining) 
among the sellers and buyers in a market (Ch. VII of Book I).                
Adam Smith did not articulate demand theory in a systematic, explicit, and 
formal way; but this articulation, which will be made explicit later by his 
disciples, can be sketched simply. Utility, or the capacity of a good to satisfy 
a consumer’s need, is classically treated, not in the abstract, but in the spe-
cific sense of use-value: the value that a person attaches to an object by 
virtue of this object’s usefulness and measured by what the person is willing 
to pay to get the object. Demand being thus founded on use-value, and use-
value being operationally WTP, Adam Smith, throughout Wealth of Nations, 
equates demand directly to ‘those who are willing to pay’ a price. Elaborat-
ing on his work, the other classical economists also recognized explicitly 
WTP as the relevant concept in classical demand theory. Malthus, for ex-
ample, announced early in his Principles that ‘demand will be represented 
and measured by the sacrifice in money which the demanders are willing 
11 
    
  
and able to make in order to satisfy their wants.’ (Malthus, [1820] 1836, p 
62)  
The systematic and formal presentation of this classical demand theory ap-
pears in the important yet often overlooked French contribution to classical 
value theory, notably the works of Germain Garnier, Jean-Baptiste Say, Au-
gustin Cournot, and Jules Dupuit, but also the Italian Pellegrino Rossi, who 
succeeded J.-B. Say at College de France’s economics chair.10 We see and 
interpret the French classical literature as a substantive rather than a mere 
echo, or popularization, of British classical economics; nor do we see it as 
detached from the classical school and interpreted as an anticipation of 
marginal-utility theory. Cournot, firmly in the classical stream, can be said 
to have charted new directions, notably on supply theory, which prepared 
the ground for the transition to neoclassical economics (though Cournot’s 
views are more nuanced than its interpretations)11. Jules Dupuit, refining an 
intuition of J.-B. Say, clarified that use-value corresponds more precisely, 
not to any WTP, but to maximum WTP reservation price. J.S. Mill reached 
the same conclusion, putting it more technically: ‘Value in use […] is the 
extreme limit of value in exchange.’ Or: ‘the utility of a thing in the estima-
tion of the purchaser, is the extreme limit of its exchange value [the maxi-
mum price the purchaser would be willing to pay].’ (Mill [1848] 1909, bk. 3: 
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chap. 1, sec. 2; chap. 2, sec. 1.) Although no classical economist stated it 
explicitly, a consumer’s demand follows by definition of the consumer’s val-
uation: willingness to buy any unit whose value is greater than the price. 
This basic inequality, as formally emphasized in Section 4, defines entirely 
the market demand function, which is simply the total number of units that 
are valued more than the price offered: namely the complementary distri-
bution function of consumers’ values.  
As to the foundation of classical demand, namely the determinants of WTP 
itself, it is not utility in the absolute, but a mix of utility and wealth. Need, 
unlike wealth, is a primitive demand concept.12 Consumers buy goods to 
satisfy a list of needs: to each need is associated a certain good (or collec-
tion of goods) that satisfies it. A consumer’s demand decision is shaped by 
a pyramid or hierarchy of needs, a ranking of needs from the most urgent 
to the least urgent: broadly speaking, from necessities, conveniences, to 
luxuries and fancies.13  
This hierarchy of needs is the fundamental principle of classical demand the-
ory, as shown with great clarity by J.-B. Say ([1828] 2010, p. 368) and as 
recognized by Dupuit (1849, p. 15), quoting Rossi’s exposition ([1840] 1865, 
Lesson 5, pp. 87-88). The hierarchy of needs is partly objective, even uni-
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versal. Thus, no good is valued higher than water, which serves a vital bio-
logical need; a diamond, serving an ornamental need, is valued lower, since 
one would be willing to give all diamonds at hand to survive. Yet the market 
prices for a cup of water and a diamond (or their objective exchange values) 
are inversely related to their subjective valuations—a paradox which is 
long-known to be solved by the concept of scarcity, and which no classical 
economist regarded as an unsolved mystery (Inoua & Smith, 2020a). But 
the hierarchy of needs is in part subjective as well. At any rate, the econo-
mist takes a consumer’s needs as given.              
In summary, the classical value literature from Adam Smith to Jules Dupuit 
offers a consistent picture of demand, which Marshall attempted to recon-
cile with the newborn marginal school.14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
2.3 Classical cost and supply decision 
Cournot, who beautifully expounds the old view on demand in one fasci-
nating paragraph ([1838] 1897, p. 50), goes on, however, to introduce an 
abstract theory of atomistic profit-maximizing firms—which will become 
the standard view on supply in the hands of the marginalists. Like utility 
maximization, profit maximization thus conceived raises decision problems 
that actual firms hardly face; for example, it leads to an ill-defined supply 
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function when marginal cost is nonincreasing (most manufactured prod-
ucts?)15 or zero (information products such as software programs). The 
basic problem lies in the definition of the firm’s production possibility set 
as an unbounded set: thus, a firm facing a constant unit cost, for example, 
would be willing to supply an infinite amount of output when facing a price 
greater than the unit cost. Consider in contrast an actual firm under the 
same cost condition: granted that the firm’s maximum production capacity 
is finite, its supply decision is obvious: willing to supply every producible 
unit at any price greater than the unit cost.  
Prior to Cournot’s innovation, the discussion on supply decision seems to 
presume none other than the basic principle, taken for granted, of willing-
ness to supply whenever it is profitable to do so, that is, at any price beyond 
a minimum acceptable price (the minimum WTA). Like classical demand, 
classical supply is not explicitly and formally defined; yet it goes without 
saying, by definition of the concept of minimum price, which corresponds 
to the cost of production, or more precisely the cost of supplying the com-
modity to the market. Classical cost is the monetary evaluation of all the 
sacrifices the producer makes in order to supply the commodity, including 
the expectation of a minimum profit compensation (without which none 
would engage in the toil and trouble of producing). Regarding this monetary 
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cost valuation, Adam Smith, and this is crucial, assumes none other than 
the actual practice of firms in their cost accounting: not only the obvious 
part, wages and the cost of raw materials (determined by market rates), but 
also the monetary estimate of the use of fixed capital (allowance for depre-
ciation), and the producer’s minimum compensation, which is a subjective 
evaluation in general; but would expect at least the ‘ordinary profit’ in the 
industry. Adam Smith, who particularly emphasizes this actual practice of 
firms on many occasions, faces none of the technical complications of later 
authors who will treat capital as a physical agent of production (the aggre-
gation problem as it applies to fixed capital).16 Granted the cost valuation 
(a monetary evaluation of all expenses of production), which is the pro-
ducer’s minimum WTA, the producer is willing to supply any unit at a price 
that covers at least the money cost: willingness to sell any unit whose cost 
is lower than the price. This inequality, as emphasized below, defines en-
tirely the supply function: since market supply is the number of units that 
can be supplied profitably, it is given by the cumulative distribution function 
of the unit costs.       
2.4 Limitations of Marshall’s synthesis   
Marshall’s insightful attempt to revive the classical method does not pay 
full justice to the old paradigm, due to his desire to integrate neoclassical 
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utility theory into his treatment. For example, he defines the demand func-
tion as the surplus-maximizing quantity of a representative consumer that 
hypothetically buy by infinitesimal increments of the commodity, and he 
founded the law of demand on diminishing marginal WTP (or ‘demand 
price’); he defines supply similarly. This and other neoclassical imports play 
no essential role in the classical formulation, and none when Marshall is 
brought to a description of price formation in a local country market. [Mar-
shall ([1890] 1920, Book V, Chap. II) simply reverts to a WTP/WTA descrip-
tion of “higgling and bargaining” as we find it in A. Smith ([1776] 1904, Book 
I, Ch. VII).]                                                                                                                                          
Marshall ([1890] 1920, p. 64) acknowledges that economic reality is discon-
tinuous in regard not only to the quantity of goods but also of individual 
behavior, but demand is smoothed, “in so far as the motives of that action 
are measurable by a money price; and in these broad results the variety 
and the fickleness of individual action are merged in the comparatively 
regular aggregate of the action of many”; a form of  the law of large num-
bers. The motivation for this theoretical procedure is this other equally im-
portant principle of classical methodology noted in the introduction, 
which Cournot expressed in a most fascinating way ([1838] 1897, p. 50), 
and which consists more generally of investigating economic regularities 
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as collective regularities emerging by aggregation over agents. For the 
classical economists, this meant aggregation over the distribution of 
agents’ characteristics, and not just a hypothetical average agent, as Mar-
shall did.   
Finally, we have Marshall’s deviation from the old school in regards to his 
dealing with wealth effects through his oft-discussed clause of constant 
marginal utility of wealth, which may be erroneously interpreted to mean 
that thinking in terms of reservation price is a narrow case of the utility-
function view; though Marshall in fact goes on to argue that variations in 
marginal utility of wealth, like the discontinuities of demand with respect 
to price variations, are of no significance on the aggregate of many consum-
ers, with poor and rich, young and old combined (Marshall, [1890] 1920, 
pp. 15-16, 83). Space forbids to elaborate further on Marshall’s synthesis. 
Rather this paper concerns the restoration of the old school, on its own 
merits, bereft of Marshall’s attempted synthesis.            
3 Supply         
3.1 The market supply function 
Consider a market economy in which n goods and services (including labor 




p pp A producer in any market 
is willing to sell any unit that can be produced profitably. Consider a given 
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commodity, which we single out by not indexing it. In terms of cost, each 
unit of a commodity produced is characterized by the number of inputs 
from other commodities its production required, which we denote generi-




a aa and the input prices. Thus, the cost of a unit 
of a commodity is  
 .
k kk
c a p ap  (1) 
Different units clearly may cost differently to produce since they may in-
volve a different mix [ , ].a p The producer would be willing to sell any unit at 
a price .p c  The function that associates to any price vector the total num-
ber of units of that commodity that would be supplied, at this price vector, 
by all the producers in the market is, by definition, the market supply func-
tion. It is by construction the cumulative distribution function of unit costs, 
which is a non-decreasing step function of the market price, ceteris paribus:  
 ( ) ( ),S SFa, p a, p                                 (2) 
where by definition ( , ) ( )F c pa p and ( , )S S a  is the total (maximum) 
supply capacity in the market (the total number of units that can be sup-
plied, which would be fully supplied were the market price infinite); for a 
particular market, the distribution in question refers to the collection of all 
units of the same commodity. 
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Figure 1: Market supply is the cumulative distribution of unit costs. 
The prices of inputs assumed fixed here: their changes corresponding 
to shifts of the supply curve. 
 
The relevant unit of analysis in supply theory is the supply for a unit of a 
commodity: ( ) 1
j
S p if ,
j
c p and ( ) 0,
j
S p otherwise. The supply of a firm 
is simply is a list of such elementary supplies: it is entirely specified by the 
number of units the firm can produce and the corresponding list of costs for 
each unit.  
3.2 The labor theory of value 
Unlike Ricardo (and his followers), Adam Smith mentioned only passingly 
the labor theory of value which applies only in rude societies: 
“In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the 
accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion 
between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different 
20 
    
  
objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule 
for exchanging them for one another. If among a nation of hunt-
ers…it usually costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to 
kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth 
two deer…the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be 
worth double…the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.18 
(Smith, [1976] 1904, p. 49) 
Ricardo himself makes it clear that the labor theory of value applies only 
when goods can be produced with homogenous labor, in abundant 
amounts, and at proportional costs (which excludes the complications of 
the diversity of fixed capital that Ricardo would later deal with); Ricardo 
later concedes that quantity of labor is the dominant (not the sole determi-
nant) of price, at least in the long run. Both J.-B. Say and Malthus oppose 
Ricardo even regarding long-run value, which, as they point out, is deter-
mined by both supply and demand. Although historically Ricardo is perhaps 
the most influential of the classical economists, it is a mistake to view Ri-
cardo’s formulation as a culmination of this school of thought; it is not true 
upon scrutiny that Ricardo was resolving inconsistencies in Adam Smith’s 
view; Ricardo was dealing with technical complications (the diversity of la-
21 
    
  
bor and fixed capital) that are precisely the reason why Adam Smith men-
tions only passingly labor theory of value and goes on to develop (Book I, 
Ch. VII) the general theory of market price formation. For example, Ricardo 
deals with the diversity of labor following Adam Smith’s view that wage dif-
ferentials are determined by the ‘higgling and bargaining’ of the market; 
but this is precisely why the relevant price theory in general is a theory of 
supply and demand. While this point is now commonplace in economics, 
yet Adam Smith in most commentaries on classicalism is overshadowed by 
Ricardo; and the classical school is still commonly reduced to the labor the-
ory of value, although much of the controversies that opposed Ricardo to 
both Say and Malthus pertains precisely to Ricardo’s reduction of this 
school of thought and his downplaying the role of demand in price theory. 
Let it be reminded that the labor theory of value is equivalent to assuming 
a Leontief price system, as known since the influential revival of Ricardo’s 
theory by Sraffa (1960); see Inoua and Smith (2020a). 
4 Demand        
4.1 The market demand function     
For a given commodity, let 1
k
h if a consumer considers commodity k  is 







h hh . Consumers differ in terms of hierarchy of needs h  
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and wealth .w Let the distribution of these consumers’ attributes be referred 
to as [ , ]wh . A unit of a commodity will be demanded by a consumer if the 
money left out of his wealth, once more urgent needs are considered, can 
afford the unit: that is, if (w ) .k k kh p p Thus the consumer’s valuation of 
the commodity, as given by his maximum WTP for it (reservation price) is                                                                                                                       
 .k k kv w h p w hp                          (3)  
The consumer would be willing to buy every unit whose .v p  The market 
demand function at any price is therefore the number of units of the good 
to which consumers attach a greater value than the price: it is by construc-
tion the complementary distribution function of the consumers’ reserva-
tion prices, which is a non-increasing step function of price, ceteris paribus, 
which we write generically:                                                                        
 ( , , ) ( , , ),D w DG wh p h p      (4) 
where ( , , )G wh p ( )v p and ( , , )D D wh 0  is the total (maximum) number 
of units of the good that consumers need (their overall demand were the 
market price zero).  
23 
    
  
 
Figure 2: Market demand is the complementary distribution 
function of consumers’ valuations (or reservation prices). 
  
4.2 Remarks on a few conceptual distinctions 
Quantity: needed versus demanded versus bought 
The focus on the elementary demand for a unit of a good irrespective of the 
identity of the demander, is on purpose, as unit demand is the relevant unit 
of analysis. The total demand of a consumer is merely a list of unit demands: 
it is entirely specified by the number of units the consumer needs and their 
reservation prices. Let ( , , )
i i i
d d Wh p be the consumer’s demand function 
for commodity .i  The demand (resp. supply) function, be it reminded, indi-
cates the quantity the consumer would demand were the consumer facing 
any arbitrary price p . The total quantity needed is ( , , ).
i i i
d d Wh 0 19 It is a 
different concept from the quantity the consumer succeeded to actually 
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buy, which depends on the extent of competition in the market. The dis-
tinction more generally between quantity demanded or supplied (willing-
ness to trade) and the quantity actually traded is of utmost importance: se-
rious paradoxes and conceptual obstacles in the neoclassical theory of price 
formation can be shown to be due to failure to acknowledge explicitly ac-
tual trades as a conceptually district notion from a supply and demand func-
tion, which summarize all willingness to buy and sell at any possible price; 
since Walras, for example, it is common to treat supply and demand as if 
always fulfilled into actual trades, which would be the case only in equilib-
rium.  
Complements and substitutes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Realistically, the relationship among commodities are binary. Consider two 
commodities i  and k  viewed from the consumer’s viewpoint. By definition, 
the two goods are complementary if they jointly serve the same need, and 




d and vice versa. They are 
substitutes if they serve the same need, but interchangeably, so that de-




d  and vice 
versa. In both cases, demand for one good derives logically from demand 
for the other: theoretically, therefore, all substitutes, on the one hand, and 
all complements, on the other, can be treated mathematically as forming 
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one class of goods, of which knowledge of one element is like knowledge of 
the whole. Thus, we are left with the hierarchical relation among goods as 
the essential notion in demand decision: good i  is more urgent than good 
k if 0
i
d  implies 0.
k
d  
4.3 The pyramidal model of market demand    
The law of demand and the law of supply, as we saw (Figure 1 and Figure 
2), hold by construction, in the sense that market demand and market sup-
ply are, respectively, nonincreasing and nondecreasing (step) functions of 
price, ceteris paribus. This weak version of the two laws is all that the theory 
of price formation requires in general (Inoua & Smith, 2020b). But stronger 
versions can also be derived under minimum assumptions, as the French 
classical20 economists emphasize; we derive them formally now.      
For partial-equilibrium purposes, let wealth distribution and the prices of 
related goods be given. In a sufficiently large market, as Cournot beautifully 
emphasized ([1838] 1897, p. 50), market demand (resp. market supply) can 
be assumed to be a smoothly decreasing (increasing) function of price. A 
large market can be formally defined as an idealized version of a market 
that involves a sufficiently large number of distinct values and costs mod-
eled by continuous density functions supported on continuums. Formally, a 
large market is therefore one for which the distribution of costs and values 
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are modeled by the continuous density functions 'F  and 'G  supported on 
the intervals 
min max
[ , ]c c  and 
min max
[ , ]v v  respectively, over which the density 
functions are strictly positive by definition. It then follows by construction
/S p '( ) 0SF p  and /D p '( ) 0DG p  on the respective supports.     
Now, consider a market in isolation, setting 0hp  in (3), so that v w and 
( , , )G wh p ( )G p ( ),w p so that market demand is given by the distribu-
tion of wealth across consumers, which Garnier, Say, and Dupuit repre-
sented as a pyramid  (Figure 3), whose top represents the wealthy minority 
and whose base represents the poor majority: more generally, the pyramid 
represents the distribution, not of wealth per se, but of the portion of 
wealth each consumer would be willing to pay for the commodity (Garnier, 
[1796] 1846, pp. 195-196; Say, [1828] 2010, p. 370, footnote 1). The pyram-
idal assumption in formal and general terms simply means a decreasing 
probability density of wealth or WTP more generally, '' 0,G  so that mar-
ket demand is a convex function of price, as Dupuit insightfully observed 
(1844, pp. 367-368). Unlike the law of demand proper, however, this con-
vexity property, sometimes referred to as Dupuit’s second ‘law’ of demand 
(Ekelund Jr & Thornton, 1991; Humphrey, 1992 )21, is true only to the extent 
that the pyramidal assumption is true: it is not essential to price theory.  
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Figure 3: Pyramidal model of market demand (Garnier, Say, Dupuit). The pyra-
mid (left) represents the distribution in society of wealth (top=the wealthiest, 
bottom=the poorest), or more precisely the distribution of consumers’ WTP. 
Market demand, at each price, is measured by the cross-sectional area of the 
pyramid corresponding to the price. If price is zero, all consumers can afford the 
good; as price increases, a lower and lower fraction of society can afford the 
good; and beyond some maximum value (125), none can afford the good.        
 
 
Figure 4: Triangular market demand model (2-dimensional version the pyram-
idal model): market demand is the length of the segment XY: it is a linear func-
tion (as can be proven from elementary geometry). The pyramidal market de-
mand (3-dimentiomal) is simply the square of this triangular market demand.  
  
For illustration, assume (following Garnier, Say, and Dupuit) a square pyra-
mid (Figure 3): then market demand is simply the square of its two-dimen-
sional image (Figure 4), obtained by reducing the pyramid to a triangle, and 
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the cross-sectional areas of the pyramid to segment lengths. It can be 
shown from elementary geometry [Thales’s (intercept) and Pythagoras’s 










This corresponds to a uniform probability distribution of consumers’ reser-
vation prices supported on 
max
[0, ].v  [The extension to the general case 
min max
[ , ]v v  is straightforward: 
max max min
( ) ( ) ( ).G p v p v v/ ] The two-dimen-
sional, pyramidal, model yields (assuming again a square pyramid) 
 2max
max
( ) ( ) ,
v p
G p v  (6) 
which is indeed a (strictly) convex demand function. It should be insisted 
that the law of demand, even in its smooth version, holds for any continu-
ous probability distribution of consumer valuations; it is only the secondary, 
convexity, property that requires the pyramidal assumption '' 0.G 22  
Although this probabilistic view on demand (based on the distribution of 
consumers, as ranked in different orders of society based on WTP, or, as we 
would say today, in different statistical classes), was first formalized in the 
French literature, it was in fact implicit throughout the classical school: thus 
Adam Smith was implicitly treating consumers in that way when, for exam-
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ple, he observed in his Lectures that ‘everything is dearer or cheaper ac-
cording as it is the purchase of a higher or lower set of people’ (A. Smith, 
[1763] 1869, p. 177).   
5 Conclusion  
The classical economists mostly adopted the same realistic view of the mar-
ket economy; not that they concurred to it by an explicit a priori methodo-
logical commitment; but, rather, they concurred to it because they were 
essentially adopting the same mentalizing process, which consists, first of 
all, of carefully observing everyday economic life, and then deriving from 
this acute observation, deep emergent regularities that are unintended 
consequences of these ordinary individual behaviors and interactions. J.-B. 
Say explained this classical methodology with great clarity in his Cours com-
plet (and complained that Ricardo at times deviated from it).23  
But in place of this realistic methodology, the early neoclassical economists 
substituted a-priori axiomatic theorizing, whereby a theorist starts before-
hand with a set of axioms (for example: pleasure explains every move in 
human behavior) and from these abstract premises, constructs through a 
chain of formal deductions an imaginary economy (often populated by a 
single player: Robinson Crusoe); and even after the axioms have proved, 
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upon more scrutiny, to be empirically empty by the barrenness of their im-
plications, the as-if theorist finds further refuge in fiction, and an excuse for 
holding onto these axioms. Thus, price-taking behavior, for example, was 
recognized from the very beginning to be a dead end as a premise for a 
theory of competitive market price formation (for if everyone in the econ-
omy takes price as given, where do these prices come from in the first 
place?) Yet in the face of this dead end, an early evasion simply assumed a 
perfect market in which supply and demand and the consequent equilib-
rium price are perfect knowledge to every trader beforehand (Jevons, 
[1871] 1888). A second, now-standard, escape consists of simply postulat-
ing the existence of a fictional auctioneer who seeks all equilibrium prices 
by trial and error (Walras, [1874] 1954).24 In the same spirit, the aggregation 
problem of neoclassical demand is evaded through the representative-con-
sumer assumption.          
References 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1986). Rationality of self and others in an economic system. 
Journal of business, S385-S399.  
Blinder, A. S., Canetti, E. R., Lebow, D. E., & Rudd, J. B. (1998). Asking about 
prices. Russel Sage Foundation, New York.  
31 
    
  
Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An Experimental Imperfect Market. Journal of 
political economy, 56(2), 95-108.  
Cournot, A. A. ([1838] 1897). Researches into the Mathematical Principles 
of the Theory of Wealth. London: Macmillan. 
Crockett, S., Friedman, D., & Oprea, R. (2019). Revealed Preferences and 
General Equilibrium: A Laboratory Study. Working paper.  
De Quincey, T. (1844). The Logic of Political Economy. Edinburgh and 
London: William Blackwood and Sons. 
Debreu, G. (1974). Excess demand functions. Journal of mathematical 
economics, 1(1), 15-21.  
Dupuit, J. (1844). De la mesure de l'utilité des travaux publics Annales des 
ponts et chaussées(116), 332-375.  
Dupuit, J. (1849). De l'influence des péages sur l'utilité des voies de 
communication. Annales des ponts et chaussées(207), 170-248.  
Ekelund Jr, R. B., & Hébert, R. F. (1999). Secret origins of modern 
microeconomics: Dupuit and the engineers. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ekelund Jr, R. B., & Thornton, M. (1991). Geometric analogies and market 
demand estimation: Dupuit and the French contribution. History of 
Political Economy, 23(3), 397-418.  
32 
    
  
Ferguson, Adam (1782) An Essay in the History of Civil Society. London: T. 
Cadell. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ferguson-an-essay-on-the-
history-of-civil-society?q=human+design#Ferguson_1229_344 
Garnier, G. ([1796] 1846). Abrégé élémentaire des principes de l'économie 
politique. Paris: Agasse. 
Grandmont, J.-M. (1987). Distributions of Preferences and the "Law of 
Demand". Econometrica, 155-161.  
Hildebrand, W. (1994). Market Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hildenbrand, W. (1983). On the "law of demand". Econometrica, 997-1019.  
Humphrey, T. M. (1992 ). Marshallian cross diagrams and their uses before 
Alfred Marshall: the origins of supply and demand geometry. Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond(Mar/Apr), 3-23.  
Inoua, S. M., & Smith, V. L. (2020a). Adam Smith’s Theory of Value: A 
Mathematical Statement of his Market Price Discovery Process. ESI 
Working Papers, February 2020(20-10). Retrieved from 
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/304/ 
Inoua, S. M., & Smith, V. L. (2020b). The Classical Theory of Price Formation 
ESI Working Papers.  
33 
    
  
Jevons, W. S. ([1871] 1888). The Theory of Political Economy London: 
Macmillan. 
Keen, S. (2011). Debunking economics–Revised, expanded and integrated 
edition: The naked emperor dethroned. In: London: Zed Books. 
Kirman, A. (1989). The intrinsic limits of modern economic theory: the 
emperor has no clothes. The Economic Journal, 99(395), 126-139.  
Kirman, A. P. (1992). Whom or what does the representative individual 
represent? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 117-136.  
Malthus, T. R. ([1820] 1836). Principles of Political Economy Considered with 
a View to their Practical Application. London: Pickering. 
Mantel, R. (1974). On the characterization of aggregate excess demand. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 7(3), 348-353.  
Marshall, A. ([1890] 1920). Principles of Economics (8 ed.). London 
Macmillan. 
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review, 
50(4), 370-396.  
Mill, J. S. ([1848] 1909). Principles of Political Economy with some of their 
Applications to Social Philosophy 
 (W. J. Ashley Ed. 7 ed.). London: Longmans, Green   
34 
    
  
Mill, J. S. ([1848] 1965). Principles of Political Economy with some of their 
Applications to Social Philosophy (Volume III of The Collected Works of 
John Stuart Mill: Books III-V and Appendices). Toronto, London: University 
of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Rizvi, S. A. T. (2006). The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results after thirty 
years. History of Political Economy, 38, 228.  
Rossi, P. ([1840] 1865). Cours d’économie politique (4 ed. Vol. I). Paris: 
Guillaumin. 
Roth, A. E., & Kagel, J. H. (1995). The handbook of experimental economics 
(Vol. 1). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press  
Say, J.-B. (1803 [2006]). Traité d'économie politique ou simple exposition de 
la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses 
(Vol. 2). Paris: Economica. 
Say, J.-B. ([1828] 2010). Cours complet d'économie politique pratique (Vol. 
1). Paris: Economica. 
Shafer, W., & Sonnenschein, H. (1993). Market demand and excess demand 
functions. Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 2, 671-693.  
Shaikh, A. (2012). Rethinking Microeconomics: A Proposed Reconstruction. 
New School for Social Research Department of Economics Working Paper, 
2012(06).  
35 
    
  
Smith, A. ([1763] 1869). Lectures on justice, police, revenue and arms (or 
Lectures on Jurisprudence) (E. Cannan Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon  
Smith, A. ([1776] 1904). The Wealth of Nations (E. Cannan Ed.). London: 
Methuen. 
Smith, A. ([1759 1976). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (D. Raphael and A. 
Macfie Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. 
Journal of political economy, 70(2), 111-137.  
Sonnenschein, H. (1972). Market excess demand functions. Econometrica, 
549-563.  
Sonnenschein, H. (1973a). Do Walras' identity and continuity characterize 
the class of community excess demand functions? Journal of Economic 
Theory, 6(4), 345-354.  
Sonnenschein, H. (1973b). The utility hypothesis and market demand 
theory. Economic Inquiry, 11(4), 404-410.  
Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: 
Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Indian 1963 ed.). Bombay: Vora 
& Co. 
Trockel, W. (1984). Market demand: an analysis of large economies with 
non-convex preferences: Springer Verlag. 
36 
    
  
Walras, L. ([1874] 1954). Elements of Pure Economics (W. Jaffé, Trans.). New 
York: Kelly. 
 
1 In the standard undergraduate intermediate theory course the consumer 
chooses units (x1, x2) of goods defined on a continuous commodity space 
to Max U (x1, x2) [increasing and concave in (x1, x2)] subject to I = p1x1 + 
p2x2, given (U, I, p1, p2). Every aspect of this model is contrary to the clas-
sical economic model, wherein: (1) the consumer chooses only discrete 
units of goods [the primary meaningful application to continuous action 
spaces is in finance]; (2) if income is fixed and constrains choice, wealth is 
stationery, but the classical economists saw as their end and purpose to 
inquire as to the nature and causes of the wealth of nations; (3) prices and 
income were to be determined in the market, and were not given to it; (4) 
U was a hidden variable to the classics, but people in markets revealed that 
they had willingness to pay demand valuations for goods, and for inputs to 
supply goods, and these were central to their analysis. 
 
2 That is, the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sonnenschein, 1972, 
1973a, 1973b; Debreu, 1974; Mantel, 1974; Shafer & Sonnenschein, 1993; 
Rizvi, 2006).       
3 This abstract revival of the law of demand as an aggregate regularity, sys-
tematically explored in Hildebrand (1994), can be viewed as part of the gen-
eral ‘regularity by aggregation’ literature, which seeks to solve the multiple 
indeterminacy of neoclassical theory (e.g. the indeterminacy of demand 
when preferences are non-convex). For an overview of this literature, see 
Trockel (1984).  
The probabilistic view on demand has in fact resurfaced in different other 
forms even before the SMD crisis; for example, Becker’s intuition that even 
impulsive or random consumer choice constrained by a budget would obey 
the law of demand by aggregation, independently of utility maximization 
(Becker, 1962); for a recent revival of this view, see (Shaikh, 2012); for a 
recent experimental exploration in a general-equilibrium context, see 











4 Classical market price theory is not to be confounded with the labor theory 
of value, on which Ricardo insisted, and which is a diversion from the gen-
eral classical theory of price formation; the precise conditions under which 
the labor value theory applies are restated in 3.2; for a formal derivation 
see Inoua and Smith (2020a). 
5 “[N]ations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of 
human action, but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson, 
1782, p 205) 
6 A follow-up paper will present a theory of price formation that is rooted 
in the classical view on competition and relates that view to experimental 
findings on market behavior. Other more preliminary papers tackle obsta-
cles and limitations of the classical literature, which may seriously impede 
or even discourage the modern reader’s assessment of the old literature, 
and explains the articulation of value theory in the classical school: the tech-
nical jargon of classical economics (natural price, monopoly price, effectual 
demand); the endless classical controversies regarding essentially unsolva-
ble, metaphysical, issues (the invariable measure of value and the ultimate 
cause of value); these controversies can mislead the modern reader into 
seeing irreconcilable divergences in the classical school (and whose unity 
may thereby be questioned). 
7 None of the protagonists of this old utility-versus-cost controversy denied 
that market price is determined jointly by utility and cost: ‘Almost all writers 
have agreed substantially, and have rightly agreed, in founding exchangea-
ble value upon two elements, -power in the article valued to meet some 
natural desire or some casual purpose of man [utility], in the first place, and, 
in the second place, upon difficulty of attainment [cost]. These two ele-
ments must meet, must come into combination, before any value in ex-
change can be established.’ (De Quincey, 1844, p. 13). 
8 Following the classical terminology, Marshall ([1890] 1920, p. 282) distin-
guishes between real cost (pain, effort, difficulty of producing a product) 
from money cost (the monetary valuation of the real cost: the expenses of 
production, including a minimum profit requirement). Today we take for 










ured by the monetary sacrifices the producer makes (the expense of pro-
duction). Yet this principle (which applies to the demand side as well) will 
be adopted in the neoclassical school only as a shortcut or a concession, 
Thus, Jevons’s program, a pure subjectivism, aimed at explaining value en-
tirely in terms of pleasure (utility, demand) and its negation, pain or effort 
(disutility of labor, supply).           
9 Marshall explains this often-overlooked classical principle in a systematic 
way throughout his famous Principles of Economics ([1890] 1920), particu-
larly in Book I, Ch. II, and makes it clear that its paternity originates with 
Adam Smith, and his “unsurpassed powers of observation”. Marshall did 
not realize, however, that all the classical economists, as they followed in 
Smith’s footsteps, reached the same conclusion, that value theory should 
be founded on people’s monetary valuations. With hindsight, it was a major 
editorial mistake on the part of Marshall to have moved the section on the 
history of economics—in which he clearly explains the classical paternity of 
this principle—to the Appendix, in response to the public demand for mak-
ing the first parts of his book less tedious.                                                                                                                         
  
10 The references are G. Garnier ([1796] 1846, pp. 195-196); J.-B. Say (1803 
[2006], vol. 2, bk. 2, chap. 1; [1828] 2010, vol. 1, part 3, chap. 4), particularly 
the later book, the Cours complet, which synthetizes and extends the ma-
terial covered in Say’s earlier books; P. Rossi ([1840] 1865, Vol. I, Lesson 5); 
A. A. Cournot ([1838] 1897, chap. 4), and J. Dupuit (1844, 1849). Many of 
the relevant passages of this French literature on demand and value are 
quoted in (Ekelund Jr & Hébert, 1999). 
11 On more of the methodological innovations of Cournot, see Smith and 
Inoua (2019).       
 
12 The classical concept of WTP is out of wealth, not income. The idea of 
income as a constraint on commodity choice is conceptually a blatant neo-
classical error. Modeling choice in the current period only makes static 
sense if one of the goods is variable and constitutes saving—not consum-










not closed and part of the dynamics of wealth accumulation. For Adam 
Smith that value is security, which he saw as protection against downside 
loss: “We suffer more…when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than 
we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better. Security, therefore, 
is the first and the principal object of prudence.” (Smith, 1759, p. 213)    
      
13 More than a century later, A. Maslow (1943) offers a famous psychologi-
cal theory of the pyramid of needs.  
14 Marshall perhaps first noticed the classical methodology through his read-
ing of Cournot and Dupuit, whose influences on him he acknowledged 
([1890] 1920, p. 85, footnote 1). The remarkable thing is his seeing the con-
nection with the classical school more generally and tracing its origin back 
to Adam Smith.   
15 It was common belief in the classical literature that most (manufactured) 
goods are produced at constant or decreasing unit costs (production on a 
large scale leads to efficiency gains because it promotes a better division of 
labor, for example); only agricultural produce and mined resources were 
believed to command increasing unit costs. See, for example, Mill ([1848] 
1965, p. 464 ff.) Various modern surveys suggests that increasing marginal 
costs are indeed exceptional in practice: it seems, according to one survey 
of the US economy, that ‘only 11 percent of GDP is produced under condi-
tions of rising marginal cost.’ (Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, & Rudd, 1998) For a 
discussion of these issues with neoclassical supply theory, see Keen (2011, 
Part I, Ch. 5). 
16 This assessment of the producer’s minimum price through a realistic cost 
valuation is clearly stated throughout Wealth of Nations, starting from Ch. 
7 of Book I ([1776] 1904, p. 50). It is repeated countless times in specific 
contexts. For example: ‘When any expensive machine is erected the ex-
traordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be 
expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary 
profits.’ (p. 103) Or elsewhere: ‘The lowest price at which coals can be sold 
for any considerable time, is, like that of all other commodities, the price 
which is barely sufficient to replace, together with its ordinary profits, the 










view would appear throughout the classical literature. Marshall ( [1890] 
1920, p. 299) also clarifies this cost valuation of firms. 
17 More precisely a matrix with double entry, in more explicit notation; but 
by fixing the commodity under study, the notation is simplified from dis-
tracting indices. 
18 A source of confusion, perhaps, is the distinction between the labour the-
ory of value and the concept of labour as a measure of value, developed by 
Smith. Thus, “The value of any commodity…to the person who possesses it, 
and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for 
other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him 
to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the ex-
changeable value of all commodities.” (Smith [1776, 1904, p 32) 
19 Adam Smith introduces the distinction ‘absolute demand’ versus ‘effec-
tual demand’ to reflect the nuance between quantity needed or desired and 
quantity effectively demanded (determined by need, constrained by 
wealth). An explanation of the technical classical jargon (absolute versus 
effectual demand; natural versus monopoly price, etc.) can be found in 
Inoua and Smith (2020a).    
20 By now, there should be no reason for hesitating to refer to all of them 
simply as classical economists.      
 
21 Dupuit emphasized, besides the standard law of demand proper (as price 
drops, quantity demanded increases), a so-called second ‘law’ (Ekelund Jr 
& Thornton, 1991; Humphrey, 1992 ): the increase in demand due to a price 
drop is the higher, the lower the initial price: that is, the second derivative 
of the demand function is positive, which, as Dupuit justified intuitively, and 
as formally proven in the text, derives from the pyramidal assumption.                       
 
22 This nuance is missing in the original literature, and understandably so, 
since back then even the basic difference between continuity and differen-
tiability (let alone probability density function versus cumulative probability 










continuity at one point in his book attests ([1838] 1897, p. 50, phrase 
italicized).    
23 J.-B. Say discusses the methodology underlying classical economics in the 
opening Considerations générales of the Cours complet ([1828] 2010, pp. 3-
61).     
24 Walras merely set the stage for this fiction: the explicit introduction of 
the imaginary auctioneer in the theory of tatonnement came later.  
